Overview

The central question I'm interested in is what it means to (mis)value others, and how and why our (mis)valuations of others matter morally. When do I count as valuing others correctly or incorrectly? To what extent does this depend on our mental activities, and to what extent on what we physically do and what the rest of society does? How may or should we respond to people who value others more or less than they morally ought to?

 

I often explore these questions in relation to specific issues in moral psychology, normative ethics, and political and social philosophy, such as moral address (especially gratitude, blame, and advice), moral equality and partiality, degradation and disrespect, duties to rescue and duties not to harm, and what I call 'the ethics of mind'. I also have long-standing interests in emotion theory, just war theory, rights theory, and feminist ethics.

 

At the moment, I'm focusing on two specific projects:

​

(1) A development and defence of the idea that morality includes evaluative duties: duties to correctly evaluate (some of) the moral matters that concern others. I argue that violations of these duties are purely mental wrongings and that their instantiation in further actions - mental or physical - makes those actions wrong too. This helps us understand the distinctive wrongness of degrading and dehumanising acts, the moral offensiveness of certain forms of address, and more! (This project has recently been awarded an NWO Veni Research Grant. See 'Veni' under 'Research' for more info.)

​

(2) In a joint project with Gunnar Björnsson, I explore norms of weight-giving: norms calling for a balance in the weight given to different persons and groups over time. We argue that these norms unify and explain a wide range of moral and political phenomena, including many responses to benefitting (e.g., gratitude) and wrongdoing (e.g., blame, "negative partiality"). ​

​

Publications

​

Articles

1. "Morele Gelijkheid" ("Moral Equality"), Basisboek Ethiek (textbook ethics for university students), edited by Romy Eskens, Jeroen Hopster, Benjamin de Mesel and Thomas Nys, Boom Uitgeverij (forthcoming). 

​

2. "Enemies and Rivals" (w/ Gunnar Björnsson), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Personal Relationships, edited by Monika Betzler and Sarah Stroud, Oxford University Press,  (forthcoming).

​

3. "On Discounting Wrongdoers" (w/ Gunnar Björnsson), Analysis (forthcoming).

​

4. "Gratitude and Rights", Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 103, no. 4 (2025): 1024-1038.

​​

5. "Moral Gratitude", Journal of Applied Philosophy vol. 42, no. 1 (2025): 115-130.

​​

6. "Expressive Duties Are Demandable and Enforceable", Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 14, edited by Mark Timmons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 203-226. (For a summary and discussion at New Work in Philosophy, see here.)

​​​

7. "Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues", Utilitas vol. 36, no. 1 (2024): 64-82

​​​

8. “Other-Sacrificing Options: Reply to Lange”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 2 (2022): 290-297.

​​

9. “Is Sex with Robots Rape?”, Journal of Practical Ethics, vol. 5, no.2 (2017): 62-76. (Winner of the 3rd Annual Oxford Uehiro Prize in Practical Ethics.)

​

As editor 

1. "Symposium on Gratitude and Community", Journal of Applied Philosophy. With contributions from Lok Chui Choo, Romy Eskens, Coleen Macnamara, and George Tsai. ​

​

Reviews

1. "George Sher: A Wild West of the Mind", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 25, no. 5 (2022): 895-897.

​

In progress

1. A paper on balancing norms (w/ Gunnar Björnsson)

2. A paper on agent-regret and counterfactuals

3. A paper on the possibility of mental wronging

4. A paper on the nature and wrong of degradation 

5. A paper on morally offensive advice (w/ Jonas Haeg)